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Securities

Regulation-OUTSIDE

DIRECToR's

LIABILITY

FOR

MISLEADING CORPORATE STATEMENTS

Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277
(2d Cir. 1973)
In Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,' the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
officers and directors of the bankrupt2 Barchris Corporation were
civilly liable under section 11 of the Securities Act of 19333 for
misleading statements appearing in a BarChris prospectus. 4 BarChris recognized that even an outside director 5 who is not directly
1 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This landmark decision has been the subject of
extensive discussion. See, e.g., Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The
BarChris Case (pts. 1-2), 55 VA. L. REv. 1, 199 (1969); Note, Escott v. BarChris: "Reasonable
Investigation" and Prospectus Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 908 (1969); Comment, Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.: "Due Diligence" Defenses
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 177 (1968). See also Annot., 2
A.L.R. Fed. 180 (1969); Note, BarChris:Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLo. L. REv. 1411 (1968).
2 The dramatic rise and fall of the BarChris Construction Corporation is discussed at
length in BarChris. 283 F. Supp. at 653-80. It is also traced in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479
F.2d 1277, 1280-88 (2d Cir. 1973); see notes 23-30 -and accompanying text infra.
3 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). Section 11 is a long and elaborate scheme which imposes
liability on a corporation, its directors and underwriters, or anyone signing a registration
statement for any untrue statement of a material fact or omission to state a material fact in a
registration statement. Liability extends to "any person" acquiring the security. Id. § 77k(a).
No defenses are available to the issuing corporation, but other defendants may escape
liability by establishing the "due diligence" defense of § 11(b). Id. § 77k(b). While the
numerous refinements of this defense are beyond the scope of this Note, they are well
described in the materials cited above. See note 1 supra. Suffice it to say that a corporate
director can only escape liability by showing that
he had, after reasonable investigation,, reasonable ground to believe, and did
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1970).
Section 11 places the burden on the director to establish that he had no knowledge of
the misstatement or omission, and that he could not have discovered it with reasonable
investigation.
4 BarChris had issued a series of 5 1/2% subordinated debentures under a prospectus
which was misleading in several ways. For example, sales figures were overstated and cash
balances were misrepresented. 283 F. Supp. at 659-61. A class action was brought by certain
purchasers of the debentures under § 11 of the 1933 Act.
5 The term "outside director" is not defined in the securities laws. However, an
extra-legal distinction between "inside" and "outside" directors has developed; inside directors are those actively involved in the management and operation of the corporation.
Professor Folk has stated:
One distinctive feature of BarChris is the liability which it views section 11 as
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involved in the day-to-day management of the corporation 6 could
be liable for a misleading statement or material omission in a
registration statement. 7 To avoid liability, the outside director must
sustain a "due diligence" defense. 8 However, the court left little
doubt that such a defense would be difficult to sustain. 9
The BarChris court considered only'liability for misleading'
statements made in a registration statement. However, much important corporate information is transmitted by means of press
releases, advertisements, and oral representations.' 0 BarChris did
not consider liability for misleading statements in such mediums.
Nevertheless, five weeks after BarChris, the Second Circuit, in the
landmark case of SEC v. Texas Gulf SulfurCo.,11 demonstrated that
imposing upon "outside" directors: directors who are not also officers of the
corporation or who otherwise have no specific and intimate relationship to the
corporation which would afford them either actual knowledge of corporate affairs
or such ready access thereto as to confer a right to such information.
Folk, supra note 1, at 26; see Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1281-89 (2d Cir. 1973)
(similar description of outside director role). Professor Bishop has pointed out that "[t]here
seems to be a general consensus that outside directors-i.e., directors who are not full-time
employees of the corporation-are desirable." Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnj/cation of CorporateDirectorsand Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1092 (1968);
see Estes, Outside Directors: More Vulnerable Than Ever, 51 HARV. Bus. REv. 107 (1973).
For the purpose of this Note, an "outside director" will be defined as a director who is
not an employee and is not directly involved in the day-to-day management of the
corporation.
6 Rather than being involved in the details of management, the outside director has
overall policy responsibility. According to the court in Lanza, this responsibility involves such
activities as authorization of share issues, approval of important transactions, and general
supervision of management. See 479 F.2d at 1307-09. See also Blough, The Outside Director at
Work on the Board, 45 N.Y.S.B.J. 467, 472 (1973); Estes, supra note 5, at 113.
7 See 283 F. Supp. at 687-89; Folk, supra note 1. at 26-27. Perhaps the most significant
aspect of BarChris was the § 11 liability imposed upon two outside directors who had only
been directors for about a month, and who had had no significant involvement with the
corporation. However, they had failed to inquire into the accuracy of the registration
statement and were thereby found not to have exercised "due diligence" as required by § 11.
See generally BIough, supra note 6; Estes, supra note 5.
' See notes 3 & 7 supra.
9 None of the BarChrisdefendants were able to sustain the "due diligence" defense. 283
F. Supp. at 685-86.
10 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (misleading
press release issued by corporation). See also notes 11-15 infra.
11 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). For extensive discussions of this case, see Ruder, Texas
Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privityand State ofMind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cqses,
63 Nw. U.L. R~v. 423 (1968); Sandler & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities
Marketplace, 30 OHio ST. L.J. 225 (1969); Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 82 HARV. L. Rv.
938 (1969); Comment, Texas Gulf Sulphur: A Logical and Necessary Extension ofJudicialHistory?,
17 U. KAN. L. REv. 263 (1969). See also Comment, Fashioning a Lid for Pandora'sBox: A
Legitimate Role for Rule 10b-5 in Private Actions Against Insider Trading on a National Stock
Exchange, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 404 (1969); Symposium-Rule lOb-5: Developments in the Law, 63
Nw. U.L. REv. 452 (1968).
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Rule 10b-511 is a potent weapon against any misleading corporate
statement. 1 3 Specifically, the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company was
held to have acted in violation of Rule 1Ob-5 because of a materially
misleading press release' 4 issued by several of its officers which
inaccurately down-played the significance of a monumental strike
of ore in Canada. 15 However, as in BarChris, important questions
6
regarding the extent and scope of an outside director's liability'
were left unanswered. One such question is whether an outside
12 Rule lOb-5 states:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
"aTexas Gulf Sulphur was an enforcement proceeding brought by the SEC against the
company. The majority held that a misleading press release, even if only misleading because
of negligence, could constitute a lOb-5 violation in an SEC enforcement action. 401 F.2d at
862. However, a dispute among the judges of the Second Circuit developed as to whether
the same standards for liability should apply in a private cause of action. The majority
declined to hold that mere negligence would suffice in a private action for damages: "We do
not find it necessary to decide whether just a lack of due diligence on the part of TGS,
absent a showing of bad faith, would subject the corporation to any liability for damages." Id.
at 863. Judge Friendly, concurring, would have decided that mere negligence was not
sufficient for imposition of liability in a private cause of action even though he agreed that it
was sufficient in an SEC action. Id. at 866-69. See generally note 11 supra.
Since Texas Gulf Sulphur, the volume of lOb-5 litigation has accelerated rapidly, and the
scope of that rule has expanded. See, e.g., Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule
IOb-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 869 (1972); Roantree, The ContinuingDevelopment
of Rule 10b-5 as a Means of Enforcing the FiduciaryDuties of Directors and Controlling Shareholders,
34 U. PrrT. L. REv. 201 (1972); Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule 10b-5: Does a Publicly
Held CorporationHave an Affirmative Obligation To Disclose?, 49 DENVER L. REv. 369 (1973);
Note, Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.: Supreme Court Expansion of
Rule 10b-5, 26 Sw. L.J. 800 (1972).
Of course, there have been some limitations placed on this trend. See, e.g., Ruder,
Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DuKE L.J. 1125; Note, Naked Allegations of
Unfairnessin MergerRatios PresentNo CognizableFederalClaim Under Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5
Where There Is Full Disclosure, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 742 (1973); Comment, Rule lOb-5-Second
CircuitHolds Rule IOb-5 Inapplicable to CorporateMismanagement When FullDisclosureIs Made to
All Shareholders-Popkinv. Bishop, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1229 (1972). See also Jacobs, The Role of
SecuritiesExchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of CorporateMismanagement, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 27 (1973).
14401 F.2d at 862-64; Ruder, supra note 11, at 447-50.
15 401 F.2d at 843-47.
16 See note 13 supra and notes 65-67 and accompanying text infra.
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director who approves a corporate transaction, negotiated by
officers, is liable under Rule 1Ob-5 for misrepresentations made by
those officers during the negotiations.' 7 This question has important practical ramifications. Competent and independent outside
directors are essential to a well-managed corporation.', Strict liability placed upon outside directors for fraud perpetrated by insiders
might deter competent individuals from serving on corporate
boards.' 9 Moreover, since an outside director, by definition, is not
involved in the day-to-day operation of the corporation, it arguably
would be unfair to hold him liable for fraud over which he had
little control and about which he had no knowledge. Surely, an
outside director is physically incapable of learning every technical
detail of the transactions which he is called upon to approve. 0 On
the other hand, outside directors should not be permitted mechanically to approve corporate fraud and escape liability on the facile
ground that they are "outsiders." This would contravene the most
basic policy of the securities laws-investor protection. 2' Therefore,
a balance must be struck.
'7 This,
18

indeed, is the central issue in Lanza. See notes 22-39 infra.
Bishop, supra note 5, at 1092-93; Estes, supra note 5, at 107, 114. See generally Blough,

supra note 6.
'9 See, e.g., Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 195
(1933) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted):
Furthermore, though there may be some or many directors who do not "direct" (in
the sense that they merely draw prestige and fees from the position) there are a
great many, particularly of the larger and more complicated enterprises, who do
and yet are not personally familiar with all details of operation. Nor could their
services be obtained in most cases if they were required to investigate details of the enterprise.
The experience and judgment of men of affairs is of great value to most of our
more important corporations. To deprive enterprises of this asset would seem
uneconomic in view of the slight gains which may be expected.
20 See notes 5 & 8 supra. See also Blough, supra note 6, at 472.
21 There has never been any doubt that the theoretical bases for the securities laws are
investor protection and full disclosure. The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted, in the words
of its preamble, "[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent fraud in the sale
thereof." 48 Stat. 74; see Douglas & Bates, supra note 19, at 172-73.
The Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed that the securities laws must be
read flexibly to promote investor protection, particularly against breaches of trust by
fiduciaries. It was pointed out, in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971) (emphasis added), that
[t]he Congress made clear that "disregard of trust relationships by those whom the
law should regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web" along with manipulation, investor's ignorance, and the like. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6.
. . . [B]road discretionary powers in the regulatory agency "have been found
practically essential." Id., at 7. Hence, we do not read § 10(b) as narrowly as the
Court of Appeals .... Section lOb must be readflexibly, not technically and restrictively.
Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
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Lanza v. Drexel & Co.-ATTEMPTING To
STRIKE A BALANCE

A.

Lanza's Background

The Second Circuit addressed the difficult and important
questions surrounding the liability of outside directors in the recent
case of Lanza v. Drexel & Co. 2 2 Ironically, Lanza involved a suit
against a former outside director of the defunct BarChris Construction Corporation, 23 Bertram D. Coleman. Prior to December
1961, the officers and directors of BarChris recognized that the
industry was over-extended 2 4 and that a serious cash squeeze was
developing. 25 It was doubtful that the meteoric growth of the
bowling alley industry could continue. 6 Indeed, on December 6,
1961, it became necessary for the BarChris officers to call a "point
of crisis" meeting, which was attended by Coleman.27
It was in this context of record profits but dismal projections,
that the BarChris officers negotiated a share exchange with plaintiff Frank Lanza, the president of Victor Billiard Company.28
Twenty thousand shares of Victor Billiard were to be exchanged
for 20,428 shares of BarChris. 29 During the negotiations, Lanza
was informed of BarChris's record profits, but he was never told of
the discouraging prospects for the industry. 30 The share exchange
was approved by the BarChris directors, 3 ' including Cole22 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), affg [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
RE'.

92,826, at 90,089 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
2 In essence, the Second Circuit accepted the fact findings of the original BarChris
court. Indeed, in setting up the factual background for its opinion, the Lanza court quoted
lengthy portions of the findings of fad in BarChris. See 479 F.2d at 1281-89.
24 283 F. Supp. at 654.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 479 F.2d at 1286-87. At this meeting, Coleman learned of the serious adverse
developments facing BarChris. He also learned of the growing internal conflict within
BarChris's management and was made aware of a misleading public statement which had
been issued in October 1961. Id. Although he apparently protested this statement, he took
no action to insure that the Victor purchasers were informed of its inaccuracy. See notes
29-32 and accompanying text infra.
28 479 F.2d at 1287.
29 Id. at 1280.
30 The chronology of the negotiations is discussed in Lanza. See id. at 1283-84. See also
id. at 1312-14 (Hays, J., dissenting); id. at 1321 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
32 On November 6, 1961, the BarChris board, without Coleman present, adopted the
tentative agreement with Victor. Kircher and Birnbaum, two BarChris officers, were empowered to form an exchange contract. On November 13, Coleman was sent minutes of the
meeting and learned of the exchange with Victor. On November 21, the contract was
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man, a "respected and weighty" outside director who had not been
involved in the negotiations with Lanza.3 2 Coleman was unaware of
the specific misrepresentations made to Lanza by the BarChris
officers. 3 3 However, he was fully -aware of the discouraging developments in the industry,3 4 yet he admittedly made no investigation into the content of the negotiations.3 5
There is no doubt that if Coleman had known of the misrepresentations to Victor, his approval of the transaction would have
violated Rule lOb-5.36 The question in Lanza, however, was
whether Coleman, as an outside director who "'neither participated in nor knew of any deception,' -37 could be liable because he
had officially approved the fraudulent transaction.
The plaintiffs argued that there existed two possible bases of
presented to the board and approved. Coleman was present and voted for approval. The
closing took place on December 14, 1961, eight days after the point of crisis meeting. Id. at
1280.
32 Id. at 1318; see id.at 1283.
33Id. at 1289. This was found by the district court, and the Second Circuit could not say
it was "clearly erroneous" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Id.
34 Id. at 1284-86.
35The court's discussion of Coleman's activities makes no mention of any investigation
by Coleman into the Victor transaction. As both dissents point out, Coleman did nothing at
all with respect to the transaction; his approval was completely ministerial. See id. at 1318
(Hays, J., dissenting); id.at 1320-21 (Timbers, J., dissenting). The majority was careful to
note that in general, Coleman had been a conscientious director. Id. at 1284-89. However,
the plaintiffs' claim was based on a specific transaction which Coleman had approved. See
notes 77-95 and accompanying text infra. See also note 21 supra.
36 The court indicates at several points that if Coleman had been aware of the
misrepresentations, he would have been liable. For example the court said: "Absent knowledge or substantial participation we have refused to impose such affirmative duties of
disclosure upon Rule 10b-5 defendants." 479 F.2d at 1302 (emphasis added). Later, the
court, in discussing the prerequisites of 10b-5 liability, remarked: "[N]ormally, [the inquiry]
will be to determine whether the defendants knew the material facts misstated or omitted, or
failed or refused, after being put on notice of a possible material failure of disclosure, to
apprise themselves of the facts." Id. at 1306 n.98 (emphasis added). Indeed, the opinion is
replete with references to the fact that had Coleman had knowledge of the misstatements, he
would have been liable. See, e.g., id. at 1281, 1284, 1288-89.
The rationale for such liability stems, in part, from Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.Ind. 1966), motion to dismiss denied, 286 F. Supp. 702 (1968),
affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). In Brennan, the plaintiffs
ordered and paid for shares of Midwestern, but the brokerage firm with which they were
dealing misapplied the funds toward ill-fated speculation. The plaintiffs sued Midwestern on
the ground that, although the violation had been committed by salesmen employed by the
brokerage firm, Midwestern was aware of the violation and refused to report it. This
knowledge made Midwestern an "aider and abettor" in the fraud. See, e.g., 259 F. Supp. at
681-82.
This rationale would have applied to Coleman if he had known of the misrepresentations because he had approved the transaction. Indeed, even if he had voted against the
transaction, it is arguable that he should have been held liable. See note 84 infra.
37 479 F.2d at 1284.
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liability against Coleman. First, it was argued that Coleman had an
affirmative duty as a director to convey all adverse corporate
information which he knew to prospective purchasers of the
corporation's shares. 38 However, the court rejected this
argument. 3 9 Second, it was argued that because Coleman could
have discovered the misleading statements made during the Victor
negotiations if he had exercised due care, he therefore was negligent in approving the fraudulent transaction. This negligence, the
plaintiffs maintained, should be a sufficient basis for liability under
Rule lOb-5.4 ° This argument forced the Second Circuit to resolve
the long-standing issue of whether< scienter 4 1 is a requisite element
of recovery under Rule 10b-5. Although the district court had
evaded the sensitive scienter issue, 42 the court of appeals found
that scienter is required, and that "[a] director's liability to prospective purchasers under Rule 10b-5 can only be secondary, such as
that of an aider and abettor, a conspirator, or a substantial participant in fraud perpetrated by others. ' 43 In short, the court
found that Coleman, as an outside director, had no duty to convey
adverse information about his company to prospective purchasers,
and further that liability for misleading statements made in negotiations could be based only on proof of scienter. Negligent approval
of a fraudulent transaction by an outside director was held not
actionable.
38 Id. at 1288-89. Unfortunately, in emphasizing the general "duty to convey" aspect of
the case, the court gave inadequate consideration to the possible existence of a duty to
investigate the status of particular negotiations. A successful investigation would give the
director knowledge of fraud, and failure to act when armed with such knowledge would be a
sufficient basis for liability. See note 36 supra.
'9 479 F.2d at 1289; see notes 42-53 and accompanying text infra.
40 479 F.2d at 1299-1309.
41 The issue of whether scienter should be required in a private cause of action under
Rule 10b-5 was first raised by Judge Friendly, concurring in Texas Gulf Sulphur. See note 13
supra. The meaning of scienter, as accepted by the Lanza court (479 F.2d at 1301) and as
used in this Note is "intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a
device, scheme or artifice to defraud." See Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d
442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971). In essence, the scienter requirement involves a degree of culpability
beyond mere negligence.
42 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. at 90,104-06. The district court
said:
Coleman did not know that the documents which plaintiffs received while he
was on the board were materially false, nor did he have any reason to suspect that
they were.
Whatever requirement of due diligence there is under Rule lOb-5, it was
satisfied by Coleman's personal inquiries to the responsible parties . . ..
Id. at 90,105. But see notes 77-95 and accompanying text infra.
43 479 F.2d at 1289. The court continued:
Because Coleman owed no duty as a director to insure that [the purchasers]
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B.

The Duty To Convey Adverse Information to Prospective Purchasers
At the outset, the court dealt with the issue of whether Coleman had a directorial duty to convey adverse information about his
corporation to prospective purchasers of its stock. If the court
found that Rule lOb-5 imposed such a duty upon outside directors,
then Coleman would have been liable. 4 He was undeniably aware
of adverse developments in the bowling alley industry45 but he did
not convey this knowledge to the purchasers. However, if no duty
to convey exists, then Coleman could only be liable if he was aware
of the specific misrepresentations made during the negotiations, or
46
if he actually participated in the fraud.
The court of appeals found that neither the common law 47 nor
the legislative history of the securities laws 48 supported a conclureceived information not conveyed to them by [the insiders who negotiated the
transaction], and because Coleman was not an aider and abettor of, a conspirator in,
or a substantial participant in the fraud perpetrated upon these plaintiffs, the
complaint . . . was properly dismissed.
Id.
44 The plaintiffs' claim was based on Rule 10b-5, and both the district court and the
court of appeals focused almost exclusively on the parameters of that section. See, e.g., id.
Section 11 was inapplicable in Lanza because the Victor acquisition constituted a "private
offering" under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act and further because the claim involved "several
non-registration statement communications." Id. at 1298. Section 11 only applies to material
misstatements or omissions in a registration statement.
4' See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
4' See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
47 479 F.2d at 1291-93. The court of appeals began its common law analysis by asserting
that common law is relevant to a director's duty to convey "because it was against a common
law background that Section 10(b) was passed." Id. at 1291. Finding no duty to convey at
common law, the court emphasized the right of directors to rely on management to honestly
"attend ... to the details of management." Id. at 1292. Although this may be an accurate
statement of the common law, .this principle does not seem particularly useful in analyzing
Rule 10b-5. Certainly, the policies of the securities statutes have gone well beyond the
common law in securing investor protection. See generally III L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961); VI id. at 3534-55 (Supp. 1969).
48 479 F.2d at 1293-99. The court thoroughly analyzed the many conflicting and
ambiguous legislative reports from the hearings on § 11. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., Ist Sess. 5, 9-10, 22-23 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933); S.
REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1933). The upshot of these reports is that the Senate
believed that merely to sign the misleading statement should be sufficient for liability (see 77
CONG. REc. 2981 (1933) (debate on S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933))), while the House
believed that honesty and good faith should provide a defense. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1933). The result of this difference was a conference committee
recommendation that the director have the burden of "proving that [he] had used reasonable care to assure the accuracy of these statements." See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 26 (1933).
The court argued (479 F.2d at 1293) that this legislative background of § 11 proves that
"Congress did not intend Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to impose a duty to convey on
directors." However, it is difficult to appreciate why the "due diligence" defenses under § 11,
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sion that a duty to convey adverse information to prospective
purchasers should be imposed on outside directors. The court
pointed out that if Rule lOb-5 imposes the same duty to convey as
section 11, the more rigid procedural requirements of section 11
could be rendered nugatory. 49 The majority pointed out that
[t~o impose a duty to convey upon directors under Rule lob-5
would be to ignore th(e) Congressional intent. It would take away
from directors what is granted to them by the private offering
exemption and50 by the limitation of the due diligence duty to registration statements.

The court's argument assumes that the imposition of a "duty
to convey" would transplant section I l's affirmative disclosure
obligations to Rule 1Ob-5 without the accompanying safeguards of
the "due diligence" defenses provided for by section 11. It is
entirely true that many technical aspects of the "due diligence"
defenses would be inapplicable to a case brought under Rule
which deals with registration statements, should release a director from his general fiduciary
obligations. See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933).
The court's arguments concerning § 11 become weaker when viewed in the context of
the facts of Lanza. Even if it is agreed that directors may reasonably rely on management
with respect to the day-to-day details of management, it is difficult to characterize the Victor
transaction as such. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text infra.
49 479 F.2d at 1298-99. Section 1 lb(3)(A) provides that the director will be liable for any
misleading statement or material omission in the registration statement unless, with respect to
any portion of the statement "not purporting to be made on the authority of an expert," he
sustains the burden of proof that "he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground
to believe and did believe ... that the statements therein were true and that there was no
omission to state a material fact." Section 1 lb(3)(B) continues that liability will be imposed on
the defendant for any misleading statement or material omission in any portion of the
statement "purporting to be made upon his authority as an expert," unless he sustains the
same burden as established in 1Ib(3)(A) or else unless he proves that the representation was
not a "fair copy or extract from his report or valuation as an expert." Section 1lb(3)(C) then
provides a lesser standard of liability on the non-expert defendant with respect to the
portions of the statement "purporting to be made on the authority of an expert." Under this
section, the director must simply prove that he had "no reasonable ground to believe, and
did not believe ... that the statements therein were untrue or that there was an omission to
state a material fact." Section 1lb(3)(D) then provides that the defendant has the same
burden with respect to a statement by a public official or one purporting to be a public
document as he would have with respect to an expertized statement under 1lb(3)(C).
Further discussion of these "due diligence" defenses may be found in note 3 supra. In
addition to the "due diligence" defenses, § 11 allows the defendant to escape liability if he
resigns before the effective date of the statement and advises the Commission and issuer that
he will not be responsible. See § 1lb(1)(A-B), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(2) (1970). Also, under §
1lb(2), liability may be avoided if the statement became effective without the defendant's
knowledge, provided that the defendant promptly gives the Commission and the public
notice of his lack of knowledge.
Section 11 continues by establishing an elaborate method for recovery of damages. See §
11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
50 479 F.2d at 1299.
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1Ob-5. 5 ' However, this does not suggest that the "duty to convey"
could not fairly be imposed under Rule 10b-5. A duty to convey
under Rule 10b-5 could require a standard of conduct less demanding than under section 11-a standard of conduct akin to
traditional notions of "reasonableness" and "negligence." 52 Therefore, it is misleading to suggest that a Rule 1Ob-5 duty to convey
would undermine section 11. Nevertheless, the court rejected this
view and concluded that Rule 10b-5 should impose no duty to
convey on Coleman. As an outside director, Coleman had a, right to
rely on the officers to make full and fair disclosure to the
plaintiffs .
The court then turned to a second and more important issue.
Even without a duty to convey adverse information, Coleman
would clearly have a duty to rectify misrepresentations made to the
plaintiffs, if he knew of such misrepresentations. However, what if
by negligence he was unaware of the misrepresentations? Would
such negligence provide a sufficient basis for civil liability under
Rule 1Ob-5?
C. The Scienter Requirement
A director who aids, abets, or participates in the transaction, or
who has knowledge of misstatements, can escape 10b-5 liability
51 For a discussion of these technical aspects of the "due diligence" defense, see notes 3
& 49 supra.
52 Section 11 imposes liability beyond traditional notions of negligence.
In order to avoid liability under § 11, a potential defendant (other than an issuer) must
make a reasonable investigation of the accuracy of statements made in the registration
statement. Such an investigation might not automatically be required to avoid negligence
liability under 10b-5. See § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970). Of course, the quality of a § 11
reasonable investigation will vary with different classes of defendants.
In contrast, a duty to convey under Rule 10b-5 would not involve such an automatic
duty-it would require only that the director act reasonably.
53 479 F.2d at 1300-01, 1306-07. In holding that Coleman had a right to rely on

BarChris's officers to convey the adverse information to the purchasers, the court cited
Mader v. Armel, 461 F.2d 1134 (6th Cir. 1972), and Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp.
439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 422 F.2d 871, rehearing denied, 430 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1970).
However, in Mader, the Sixth Circuit merely affirmed a finding that the defendant director
"did not have the slightest idea anything was wrong," and relied on the technical reports of
Peat, Marwick, an accounting firm with an excellent reputation. 461 F.2d at 1126. This
stands in striking contrast to the facts in Lanza, where the defendant director was fully aware
that "something was wrong" with the industry, and had substantial reason to believe that
misleading statements had been made. See notes 80-94 and accompanying text infra.
In Moerman, the district court did use language supporting the director's right to rely on
management. 302 F. Supp. at 447. However, any right to rely afforded to directors should
only apply to the routine details of management, not to the extraordinary matters which
require directorial approval. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text infra. The Victor
exchange in Lanza required such approval, and was far from a routine detail of management. Therefore, it is difficult to understand how the court could emphasize a "right to
rely," given the facts of the case.
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only by ensuring that the misstatements are rectified before the
transaction is approved. 54 Thus, participation or knowledge gives
rise to a duty to convey. 55 However, the Lanza court found that
Coleman had no knowledge of the specific misrepresentations
made in the Victor negotiations, and was not an aider, abettor, or
participant in the transaction. 56 As a result, it became necessary for
the court to determine whether a nonparticipant outside director
who approves a transaction can be liable under Rule lOb-5 if his
approval is only negligent-i.e., if "due care" would have led him to
the discovery of the fraud. The plaintiffs' rationale was that "Coleman knew many disquieting facts about BarChris, particularly certain adverse financial developments and the making of misleading
statements to the financial community by BarChris officers." 5 7 This
knowledge made it "inexcusable" not to investigate whether full
disclosure had been made in the negotiations. 58 Furthermore:
"The plaintiffs suggested that if Coleman had inquired into the
details of the.., negotiations, he would have discovered the fraud.
In that event, Coleman could not have approved the sale of BarChris's
5 9
stock to the Lanzas without incurring liability."
In short, the plaintiffs were suggesting that negligent failure to
54 479 F.2d at 1302-05. In support of the proposition that "participation" in the
concealment would give rise to a lOb-5 claim, the court relied on the case of Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), motion to dismiss denied,
286 F. Supp. 702 (1968), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
See note 36 supra. In Brennan, the court affirmed that lOb-5 liability could be imposed on any
"participant" in a fraudulent transaction and broadly defined participation by stating that
duties are often found to arise in the face of special relationships, and there are
circumstances under which a person or a corporation may give the requisite
assistance or encouragement to a wrongdoer so as to constitute an aiding and abetting by
merely failing to take action.
259 F. Supp. at 681-82 (emphasis added); see 479 F.2d at 1303. Therefore, viewing Lanza
and Brennan together, an outside director can be liable to purchasers when he aids, abets or
even "encourages" officers acting fradulently. It follows that if a director is called upon to
approve a transaction, and if he is aware of misrepresentations which have been made to
prospective purchasers, he may avoid liability only through rectifying the misrepresentations
by disclosure to the purchasers. See Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). This rationale further implies that a duty to convey arises automatically for anyone
who is involved in the negotiations leading to a corporate transaction.
It might reasonably be suggested that Coleman's affirmative approval of the fraudulent
transaction itself constituted participation. However, the court's holding suggests that mere
approval, in the absence of fraud or recklessness, is not sufficient participation to warrant
imposition of liability.
55 See 479 F.2d at 1302.
" See, e.g., id. at 1304. Lanza is replete with statements to the effect that Coleman was
not involved in the negotiations and did not directly participate in making the material
misstatements. See, e.g., id. at 1284.
51 Id. at 1304 (emphasis added).
58 Id.

59 Id. (emphasis added).
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discover the misrepresentations should constitute a sufficient basis
for liability under Rule 10b-5, 6 0 and that scienter should not be
required. 61 However, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs'
argument and held that scienter is a necessary element of a claim
under Rule lOb-5. 62 "Mere negligence" is insufficient. 63 Liability
must be predicated upon participation in the concealment, knowledge of the misstatements, or at least recklessness 64 in the failure to
discover the misstatements. Furthermore, the court apparently
believed that because an outside director has a reasonable right to
rely on management in the daily conduct of the business, Coleman
was under no duty to investigate the underlying content of the
6 5
Victor negotiations.
The precedent and reasoning used by the Second Circuit in
imposing a scienter requirement on Rule lOb-5 are suspect. The
court cited Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 6 6 remarking that
Shemtob "eliminated any doubt that proof of scienter is required in
private actions in this circuit." 67 However, Shemtob arguably was not
decided as a 1 0b-5 case. Rather, it was a "garden variety customer's
60 Id. The. court said:
Recognizing, however, that the record in this case cannot support a holding that

Coleman's failure to inquire was in any way willful or calculated, plaintiffs, and our
dissenting Brothers, urge that liability exists under Rule lOb-5 for a "negligent"
omission to state material facts.
Id.
The court here seems to ignore "recklessness" as a possible basis of 10b-5 liability.
However, recklessness is a firmly established basis for such liability. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d
442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971).
61 If scienter is required, then Coleman would prevail because, in the opinion of the
court, he had no knowledge of the misrepresentations made in the negotiations, and did not
participate in the transaction. See, e.g., 479 F.2d at 1284. In contrast, if a finding of
negligence would sustain a 1Ob-5 claim, Coleman's knowledge of the adverse financial
picture, the internal corporate strife, and his failure to investigate the Victor exchange
before giving his approval, would have made liability difficult to avoid.
62 479 F.2d at 1304-05.
63 Citing Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971), the
court said that "it is insufficient to allege mere negligence" in a 10b-5 suit. 479 F.2d at 1305.
While this use of Shemtob is quite weak (see notes 66-69 and accompanying text infra), the
combination of Shemtob and Lanza leaves little doubt that the Second Circuit now requires
scienter.
64 479 F.2d at 1305. See generally notes 80-94 and accompanying text infra.
65 The opinion contains a series of references to the right of a director to rely on
management. See, e.g., 479 F.2d at 1306-07; id. at 1291-92 (discussing common law background); id. at 1296 (discussing legislative history); id. at 1300-01 (discussing case law
development of Rule lOb-5). Because Coleman had a right to rely on management with
respect to the Victor negotiations, he had no independent duty to investigate those negotiations. Thus, it became more difficult for the plaintiffs to characterize Coleman's conduct as
"reckless."
66 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971); see 479 F.2d at 1304-05.
67 479 F.2d at 1304.
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suit against a broker for breach of contract. '6 8 The language in
Shemtob on which the Lanza majority relied to support its conclusion
that scienter was necessary to impose liability on Coleman had been
passed on only by way of dictum. Indeed, Judge Hays's dissent in
Lanza concluded, after thorough analysis, that "this court has not
yet adjudicated the scienter-negligence issue. ' 69 Judge Hays also
pointed out that several other circuits "have ruled that scienter is
not a necessary element of a IOb-5 claim for relief. '7 0 But despite
this trend, the Second Circuit opined that "precedent" imposed a
71
scienter requirement on claims under Rule 10b-5.
The court next profferred several policy arguments to support
its scienter requirement. The court emphasized that liability for
mere negligence would deter competent individuals from serving
on corporate boards,72 and further, that such liability would be
inconsistent with the basic policies of the securities laws. 7 3 However, the overriding policy of tIe securities laws, -and particularly of
Rule 1 b-5, is the protection of investors.7 4 Therefore, it is difficult
to understand how policy arguments support the proposition that a
director may negligently approve a fraudulent transaction, without
any investigation whatsoever, and thereby escape liability to the
victimized investor. Judge Hays, dissenting in Lanza, argued that
section 1 b and Rule 1 b-5
impose upon a director of a corporation that is selling its shares
the obligation not to defraud the purchaser by either misstating
or omitting to state material facts. A director cannot escape that duty
by failing to inform himself of thefacts and developments relevant to the
sale of securities.7 5
See Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971).
479 F.2d at 1319.
70 Id.; see note 93 infra.
71 479 F.2d at 1304.
72 Id. at 1307. Justice Douglas, while a professor, had remarked:
Nor could [the] services [of many outside directors] be obtained in most cases if they
were required to investigate details of the enterprise. The experience and judgment
of men of affairs is of great value to most of our more important corporations.
Douglas & Bates, The FederalSecurities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 195 (1933); see Estes,
supra note 5, at 107, 114; note 5 supra.
The SEC has added:
Corporate directors are not normally involved in the day-to-day conduct of the
company's affairs ....
Routine managerial tasks are performed by, and are the
responsibility of, the operating officers. Directors have a right to rely on the officers
of the corporation to perform their functions in a lawful manner.
479 F.2d at 1306; see Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5, Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d
1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Blough, supra note 6, at 472.
,73 479 F.2d at 1308-09; see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
74 See note 21 supra.
75 479 F.2d at 1317-18 (emphasis added).
68
69
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Furthermore, there is no tenable reason why competent individuals
would be deterred from serving as directors by the imposition of
liability for negligent approval of fraudulent transactions, or for
the total disregard of their fiduciary obligations. BarChris imposed
a considerably more severe standard-the affirmative duty of due
diligence-to cases involving registration statements. This strict
standard has been vigorously applied to outside directors. 76 Yet
there is no indication that competent individuals have been deterred, to any significant degree, from serving on boards because of
section 11 liability. To the contrary, BarChris merely reminds directors of their obligations to the corporation.
Indeed, the Second Circuit's policy reasoning may have the
unfortunate effect of encouraging outside directors to avoid investigation into corporate transactions, knowing that only with actual
knowledge or recklessness will they be held liable. 77 In addition, it
appears that the large scale share exchange between BarChris and
Victor was far more than a routine, day-to-day corporate matter. It
was an important acquisition which involved extensive negotiations
and required directorial approval. 78 Therefore, even if a director
has the right reasonably to rely on management regarding routine
details, it does not follow that directors should be permitted to
refrain
from
investigating
large,
important
corporate
79
transactions. Thus, neither precedent nor policy would seem to
support the court's conclusion that an outside director may negligently approve a fraudulent transaction without liability under
Rule 10b-5.
1I
STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS

AFTER Lanza

A.

The Restrictive Formulation of the Scienter Requirement
In formulating a scienter requirement, the court paid lipservice to the well-established rule that "recklessness" would meet
7' See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 687-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(outside directors unable to sustain due diligence defense, even though they took office after
registration statement was prepared). See also notes 1-9 and accompanying text supra.
77 In certain instances, it might be reckless for a director to fail to investigate a
transaction. In Lanza, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully suggested (479 F.2d at 1304) and the
dissent agreed (Id. at 1321) that Coleman was reckless not to make any inquiry into the
Victor negotiations. For Lanza's possible effect on the recklessness standard, see notes 80-94
and accompanying text infra.
78 479 F.2d at 1283-84 (majority opinion); id. at 1312-13 (Hays, J., dissenting).
79 Indeed, it seems anomalous to allow a director to rely on management with respect to
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this requirement and support a 10b-5 claim. However, the court's
application of the scienter requirement to the facts of Lanza left the
future of the recklessness standard in doubt. The plaintiffs' complaint had been dismissed in district court for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.8 0 However, the complaint alleged at least four significant facts regarding Coleman's
conduct as a director: (1) knowledge of adverse financial information and protracted intracorporate strife; 8 1 (2) knowledge of "misleading statements to the financial community,"8 which assuredly
were transmitted to the plaintiffs as members of the financial
community; (3) failure to make any investigation into the content of
the negotiations; 83 and (4) approval of the admittedly fraudulent
transaction. 84 It is difficult to understand how these four allegations, if proven, would not be deemed to constitute recklessness
and thus pass the muster of the scienter requirement. This is
especially true in light of Coleman's extensive business
experience, 8 5 and the great importance of the Victor share ex86
change to BarChris.
It follows that the court has promulgated an extremely restrictive interpretation of the scienter requirement. Indeed, as Judge
Timbers pointed out in his dissent, Coleman's conduct, if anything,
constituted a "reckless disregard for the truth. 8 7 Judge Hays
agreed, arguing that Coleman had learned of BarChris's unfavorable situation and internal strife at the "point of crisis" meeting
an extraordinary acquisition. This seems to frustrate the very purpose of having outside
directors.
80 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RoPP. V 92,826
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
81 See, e.g., 479 F.2d at 1284-89, 1304.
82 Id. at 1288, 1304.
83 Id. at 1304. Both dissents point out that Coleman took no action whatsoever to
inform himself with respect to the Victor acquisition. Id. at 1316, 1318 (Hays, J., dissenting);
id. at 1321 (Timbers, J., dissenting). Coleman's approval of the transaction was completely
mechanical, evidencing a failure to fulfill his fiduciary obligations as a director.
84 There was no doubt that the transaction itself was fraudulent on the basis of the
misstatements made by the officers during the negotiations. Indeed, those officers were held
liable by the district court in Lanza. The finding of a 10b-5 violation by those officers was
apparently not appealed. See id. at 1280, 1316.
It should be noted that even if Coleman had voted against the fraudulent transaction,
under the majority's view of the case he arguably would still have had a duty to correct the
misrepresentations made to the purchasers if he had known about them. Because Coleman
voted to approve the transaction, the court did not discuss the issue.
85 See, e.g., id. at 1318 (Hays, J., dissenting).
88 See id. at 1283-89. Certainly, the more important the transaction, the less reasonable
it is for a director to mechanically rubber-stamp his approval without a reasonable investigation.
87 Id. at 1321.
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eight days before the closing of the Victor deal. 8 8 Judge Hays added
that Coleman "made no attempt to inquire as to the course of the
negotiations,' 89 and concluded:
Coleman argued that because he was an "outside" director with
respect to the negotiations with Victor, he had no duty to
intervene. I disagree. The distinction between an "inside" and an
"outside" director is irrelevant in this context, because Coleman
did nothing at all. As a director, Coleman had a duty to keep
himself adequately informed as to the activities of the corporation. He could no more close his eyes to the purchase of Victor
than he could to other important corporate developments.9"
Coleman's activities represented a total disregard of directorial
responsibility with respect to the Victor acquisition. 9 1 Furthermore,
as the majority admitted, Coleman had actual knowledge of misleading reports to the "financial community."9 2 Therefore, the
majority is actually saying that knowledge of misleading public
statements, knowledge of corporate adversity and managerial
strife, and approval of a fraudulent transaction by a highly experienced director does not constitute "scienter," even when that director fails to make the slightest investigation into the transaction.
This is an anomalous result at a time when many jurisdictions are
abandoning the scienter requirement altogether in favor of a
93
negligence standard.
88 Id. at
89 Id.

1318.

90 Id. (emphasis added).
91 The court argued that Coleman's overall conduct as a director was responsible. Id. at
1284-89. However, the court's efforts to make Coleman appear to have acted reasonably are
unconvincing. When a director attends a "point of crisis" meeting, learns of great corporate
adversity, internal strife, and misstatements to the financial community, and eight days later
approves a fraudulent transaction without the slightest investigation, it is difficult to
characterize his conduct as altogether reasonable. Furthermore, even if Coleman's overall
conduct as a director was reasonable, his handling of the Victor transaction clearly constituted a total breach of fiduciary responsibility. The United States Supreme Court has made
it clear that prevention of such fiduciary breach is a primary intention of the securities laws
and Rule 10b-5. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12
(1971). See also note 21 supra.
92 See 479 F.2d at 1288, 1304. Surely, the plaintiffs must be considered members of the
"financial community." Thus, Coleman's knowledge of misleading statements made to the
"financial community" indicated that Coleman at least knew that at some point in time
misleading statements had been made to the plaintiffs by his company.
93 See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). See also City Nat'l Bank v.
Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 995 (1970); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Stevens v.
Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d
210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); cf. Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853,
861-62 (D. Del. 1972).
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Such a restrictive formulation of the scienter rule is not only
unfair to defrauded investors, but may even encourage directors to
disengage themselves from corporate matters, because failure to do
"anything at all" immunizes them from liability under Lanza. Such
a result undercuts the primary purpose of federal regulation of
securities transactions-the protection of investors. 4
The Lack of an Integrated Standard of Liabilityfor Outside Directors
If competent and independent individuals are to be encouraged actively to serve on corporate boards, it is important that they
be apprised of the standards of liability to which they will be held
under the securities laws. At present, because there is no uniformity among the jurisdictions on whether scienter should be required under Rule 1Ob-5; 95 a director who commits a single corporate act which has effects in several jurisdictions might be liable in
some and not in others. Some victims would recover; others would
not. This type of inconsistency is both regrettable and unwarranted. Moreover, the standards of liability under different provisions of the securities laws seem to vary unpredictably. For exam96
ple, in the recent case of Gould v. American HawaiianSteamship Co.,
scienter was not required for a misleading proxy claim based on
section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated
thereunder. 97 The court recognized that, like Rule lOb-5, Rule
14a-9 contains no language which necessarily imposes a scienter
requirement.9 8 Further, those two rules are framed in quite similar
terms.9 9 In rejecting the scienter requirement for 14a-9, the court
fashioned arguments which seem to apply with equal force to Rule
1Ob-5: "This [standard] rewards the conscientious director by
B.

94 See note 21 supra. Indeed, the imposition of such a low standard of fiduciary
obligation under Rule 1Ob-5 has the result of allowing lesser standards of directorial conduct
under lOb-5 than had previously existed under the law of fiduciaries. See note 21 supra.
95 See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
96 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972); see Blough, supra note 1. See also Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301 (2d Cir. 1973).
9r 351 F. Supp. at 864-65.
98 Rule 14a-9(a) (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1973)) states:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or
oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in
any, earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same
meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
99 351 F. Supp. at 864. Nevertheless, the court is careful to distinguish its holding from
cases under Rule 1Ob-5. Id. at 864-65.
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guarding against liability for the diligent, and simultaneously, increases the incentives to more rigorously police proxy materials
thereby more effectively protecting the interests of securities
investors."' 10 Interestingly, the Second Circuit has itself rejected
the scienter requirement for cases under 14(a).' 0 Thus, despite the
great similarity in language, the Second Circuit apparently believes
that Rules 1Ob-5 and 14a-9 should be interpreted to impose different standards.' 0 2 This inconsistency renders it difficult for diligent
directors to familiarize themselves with their obligations under the
100Id. at 865. However, the court does suggest at least one distinction between Gould
and Lanza:

The additional burden of imposing a standard of reasonable care or due diligence
as opposed to actual knowledge or gross negligence is easily defendable. This is
especially true for the corporate directors in this case since they hold a position of
fiduciary trust to the very persons to whom the proxy materials were issued and
who are now seeking damages.
Id. In Gould, the fiduciary obligation was owed to the plaintiff, while in Lanza, Coleman did
not have any fiduciary obligation to the purchasers of the BarChris stock. However, this
distinction is of limited value, because liability under Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 is predicated not
on breach of fiduciary duty, but rather on breach of the duty not to defraud. There is no
requirement under either rule that the defendant be a fiduciary.
101 See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Gerstle court cited with approval Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853
(D. Del. 1972), which specifically held that scieriter should not be required in actions brought
under Rule 14a-9. See 478 F.2d at 1299. See also notes 96-100 and accompanying text supra.
After approving the'Gould rationale, Gerstle carefully distinguished cases under Rule 14a-9
from those under Rule lOb-5 (478 F.2d at 1298-1300) and affirmed the principle of Lanza.
The court remarked:
Although the language of Rule 14a-9(a) closely parallels that of Rule 10b-5, and
neither says in so many words that scienter should be a requirement, one of the
primary reasons that this court has held that this is required in a private action
under Rule lOb-5 [citing Lanza] is a concern that without some such requirement
the Rule might be invalid.
Id. at 1299.
In Gerstle, as in Gould, the policy reasoning used by the court in rejecting the scienter
standard for Rule 14a-9 seems to apply with equal force to Rule 1Ob-5. The court recognized
that the important policy of "investor protection" would be thwarted by "too liberal a
standard of culpability." Id. at 1300; see note 100 and accompanying text supra.
102 One possible justification for imposing a lesser standard of liability under Rule 1Ob-5
than under Rule 14a-9 is that Rule 14a-9, like § 11, involves a specific and clearly identifiable
securities form. When such a form is issued, the director is on notice that he has a distinct
obligation to verify the accuracy of statements made in that form. In contrast, under Rule
lOb-5, liability may result from misstatements in any medium. It is therefore more difficult
for the director to assess the parameter of his duties under Rule 1Ob-5. In the typical lOb-5
case, it is likely to be more difficult for the director to assure himself that no fraud has
occurred.
This argument does not, however, suggest that a scienter standard should be imposed
under Rule lOb-5. Rather, in determining whether a director acted "reasonably" in meeting
his lOb-5 obligations, courts should be aware that it is easier for a director to verify the
accuracy of a specific form than of a possibly diffuse series of corporate representations. But
under either Rule, if he did not act reasonably, liability should be imposed. See notes 98-99
and accompanying text supra and note 104 infra.
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securities laws. Further, in holding that Rule IOb-5 is applicable to
cases involving misleading proxies, 10 3 the United States Supreme
Court used no language to suggest that a different standard should
be imposed for these two rules. Indeed, the high court has
indicated that "10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and
restrictively."' 0 4 To read obscure distinctions into the virtually
identical language of Rules 14a-9 and 10b-5 would violate this
mandate.
The most consistent and effective approach to the myriad of
cases arising under Rules lOb-5 and 14a-9 would be simply to
require the outside director to exercise reasonable care to ensure
that misleading information is not disseminated.' 0 5 Such an approach is fully consistent with the important policy of investor
protection which underlies all securities law. Furthermore, a standard of reasonable care would not deter competent individuals
from serving on corporate boards. Rather, the consistency and
predictability of such a standard would help clarify the complex
and confusing issues surrounding an outside director's potential
liability. Thus, qualified men and women would be encouraged to
perform their duties with the courage and vigor needed in successful modern enterprises.

CONCLUSION

Lanza can be viewed as a broad affirmation of the right of
outside directors to rely on the honesty of management in the
conduct of corporate affairs. However, the purpose of having
outside directors is to provide helpful independent guidance in
important policy matters. This purpose would be frustrated if
outside directors were allowed to rubber stamp every transaction
with impunity.
103
104

SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971). See

also note 21 supra.
105 This view is not unlike the official position of the Securities Exchange Commission
as expressed in its brief as amicus curiae in the Lanza case. The SEC requested that the
Second Circuit remand the case to the district court for a finding of fact on whether
Coleman had reason to know of the misrepresentations. If Coleman had reason to know of

the misleading statements, the SEC would hold him liable. It follows that the SEC would
impose a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that misleading information is not

disseminated. However, the court explicitly rejected the SEC approach, indicating that the
director should owe no duty to the prospective purchasers. 479 F.2d at 1301-02.
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To be sure, directors deserve a reasonable right to rely on
management. But this right to rely must be balanced against the
overriding policies of investor protection and full disclosure which
have been developing since BarChris and Texas Gulf Sulphur. Lanza
stands as a roadblock to this development.
William E. Grauer

